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— NECROTECTURE: Lifeless Dwellings and London’s 
Super-Rich
ROWLAND ATKINSON
Abstract
This article problematizes the relationship between the global super-rich and 
processes of property development that have generated large volumes of underused 
residential space. Evidence is presented to show that much of London’s new skyline is 
underused or lies entirely empty, so that one interpretation of this new landscape of super-
prime residential development is that it is a kind of dead residential space or necrotecture. 
These relatively lifeless spaces can be interpreted as the particularly wasteful result of 
continuing rounds of international capital investment in the built environment and the 
overconsumption of housing and other resources by the super-rich. Necrotectural forms, 
seen in new towers and spectacular homes, appear to index a massive misdirection of 
development capacity, even as the city experiences a massive social crisis that continues to 
be played out in the wider housing market.
Introduction
In the past decade the London skyline, long noted for its relative modesty when 
compared with other global urban centres, has been bolstered by new building 
technologies and massive injections of overseas capital. These changes come at a time 
of great transition and uncertainty for the city, but the structural features of London’s 
housing, economy and built environment remain more or less intact (Marcuse and 
Madden, 2016). The city has seen capital mobilized to provide for significant numbers 
of wealthy overseas buyers, even as it suffers an enduring housing crisis for the bulk of 
its population (Minton, 2017). Rounds of purchasing by cash-rich buyers attracted to a 
city that continues to court capital and the wealthy (Atkinson et al., 2017) have been 
evident for some years. Despite emerging signs of declining prices at the apex of the 
super-prime property market, this has done little to staunch continuing flows of 
international investment capital and those ranks of the super-rich already in the city 
(Atkinson et al., 2016). The city hosts the highest numbers of super-rich individuals per 
capita of any city globally––around 3,100 ultra-high net worth individuals (UHNWIs, 
those with assets, not including property, of £20 million/US $30 million or more) and a 
further 6,100 UHNWIs with second homes in the city (Wealth-X, 2017), while the 2018 
Sunday Times rich list suggests the presence of 92 billionaires in the city.
London is one of only a handful of globally pre-eminent locations in which 
the rich choose to live or invest (Forrest et al., 2017). This concentration of the rich 
themselves and the activities of investors from overseas in the city’s property market has 
had notable efects. While many choose the city for its cultural attractions, architecture 
and schools (Paris, 2017), it is also clear that other fractions of the wealthy, ofshore 
investment vehicles and wealth funds have redirected property development capacity 
towards the luxury end of the market (Transparency International, 2016; Minton, 2017). 
The result has been the movement of more of the wealthy into the inner west, north 
and south-west super-prime property markets of the city and the creation of notable 
developments including the Shard, One Hyde Park, St George’s Wharf (an imposing tower 
near Battersea power station) and the areas around the new American embassy. A string 
of luxury developments, including The Lancasters, the Mansion House (Marylebone), 
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375 Kensington High Street and the large redevelopment of the Chelsea Barracks site as 
a luxury enclave, among many other sites, bring our attention to the massive wealth still 
arriving in London and the kinds of conspicuous luxury at a time of economic ambiguity 
regarding the city’s immediate future as Brexit looms. Many of these developments are 
underpinned by the actions of foreign buyers. Others have been inanced by sovereign 
wealth funds, notably those of Malaysia (Nine Elms) and Qatar (Shard, One Hyde Park, 
among numerous others), in which capital investment in international real estate 
projects has been deployed as an important long-term investment strategy. Most such 
projects involve the almost exclusive production of homes designated for the super-
prime market and have no affordable or social housing component. A city running 
hot on investment capital has thereby generated an intensifying social politics that is 
focused on questions of the distribution of housing resources and wealth (Gillespie et al., 
2018) while appearing to subvert the public mission of some social housing providers 
(Morrison, 2017), with massive international investors seeking to enter the afordable 
housing market. In this general context the relationship between the very wealthy and 
the wider city is emerging as a signiicant concern.
One feature of the massive changes in London’s property market, particularly 
since the completion of the Shard in 2012 (the tallest building in the European Union), 
has been the transition of London into a more emphatically vertical city (Graham, 2016), 
the consumption of which has primarily been by wealthy (though by no means always 
‘super-rich’) off-shore investors. The scale of this development, and that to come, is 
significant. A recent survey has shown that more than 510 high-rise developments 
are now in progress or have received planning permission (New London Architecture, 
2018). Yet almost none of the apartments in these towers will be afordable and close 
to zero public housing is reserved for those on no or low incomes. London’s massive 
social inequalities and housing problems emphasize the problematic position of these 
new residences as they bring into sharp relief the city’s social extremes and the inability 
of state or market to meet social need (Dorling, 2014). These contrasts have also been 
marked by a sense of social conlict generated by the inequity of empty homes worth many 
millions (Neate, 2018) in a city of massive waiting lists and competition for residential 
space. A more generalized sense of anger at empty property more generally (Booth and 
Bengtsson, 2016; Neate, 2017) has become palpable. The city’s government and investors 
have efectively earmarked development sites as the new residences of a global elite. The 
result has been the production of a built environment that is almost solely in service of 
capital investment, rather than the creation of homes and social value in any meaningful 
sense (Fernandez et al., 2016).
Flows of international capital have incentivized developers to target an 
international market of the wealthy and investors (Atkinson et al., 2017). A distinctive 
feature of this market is that in many cases units are sold primarily as investments, often 
‘of-plan’, for the purpose of realizing future capital gains, occasional sojourns in the city 
or, in the case of much illicit investment, the concealment and recycling of funds via 
of-shore investment funds. Another market, for international middle-class investors, 
operates with a related but distinct rhythm from the non-usage evident among many of 
the super-rich. This particular market segment is driven by a desire for reasonable gains 
in revenue and capital appreciation (Ho and Atkinson, 2017). The efect of the aggregate 
demand for central London apartments has been to drive enormous amounts of speculative 
construction activity in search of buyers from among the ranks of the world’s wealthy.
The luxury and scale of new tower blocks and lagship developments highlights 
the way in which housing production capacity has been ‘misdirected’ towards socially 
non-useful ends (Aalbers, 2016). The emphasis on luxury markets by many developers 
has become part of a wider story of urban social alienation. This stems from the built 
environment (including the dominating high-rise skyline emerging in the city), from 
social relations strained by imposed austerity measures and from the housing system 
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itself, generated by the result of incentives that drive it to build for proit while ignoring 
social need (Madden and Marcuse, 2017).
The opulence and scale of the architectural landscape now being produced for 
the wealthy must also of course be linked to the ideological substrate of the city of which 
it is a part. The celebration of wealth, courting of the rich themselves and the inluence 
on city politics of an urban economy dominated by inance and real estate interests is 
notable (Engelen et al., 2017; Atkinson et al., 2017). Spencer’s (2016) work on neoliberal 
architecture is also useful in helping us to think through the relationship between value 
commitments to market approaches, the celebration of unfettered social subjectivities 
and the eschewing of interest in social beneit. For Spencer, the built environment is 
important to how we might understand the inluence and play of neoliberal values and 
its deeper inluence over subjects and subjectivities in the city. The ongoing production 
of this built environment, even while hugely underutilized and out of the reach of most 
citizens, continues to avoid addressing the pronounced and deepening social needs of 
those in the wider city. These processes generate a socially selective sorting of people and 
places that leads to the physical dislocation of the urban poor and triumph of narratives 
that suggest that the urban poor are unwilling to engage in the economy (Minton, 2017). 
Amidst rapid social and physical change, the city displays a continued underlying and 
machinic commitment to the needs of capital. This is the setting of this article which asks 
how might we begin to understand this residential landscape and its excesses.
Dead space
The net result of investment by the super-rich being courted by city 
administrations has been the creation of a signiicant landscape of empty residential 
units. This has generated intense social anger and resentment in light of prevailing 
welfare austerity measures, poor track record on house building, attacks on public 
housing and what many see as nothing less than a war on the urban poor (Watt, 2016). 
Analysis of London’s dramatically evolving skylines shows that this is largely an 
exclusive landscape, of limits to those distressed and upended by the property market 
across the city (Atkinson et al., 2016). It is also, as we shall see, one implicated in illicit 
lows of laundered money (Platt, 2015), poor planning decisions and largely absent 
owners who do little for the city’s wider economy (Fernandez et al., 2016). Changes to 
many of the core ‘alpha’ cities of the global North have been particularly signiicant over 
the past decade. As analysts like Graham (2016) have argued, the global story of vertical 
living has been invigorated by enormous lows of international capital in search of new 
and secure investment opportunities. In cities like London, New York, Singapore and 
Tokyo, high-rise and other luxury development highlights the presence and expansion 
of the monied ranks of the super-rich (Forrest et al., 2017).
Though the built environment is often assumed to have a near endless lifespan, 
it is clear that buildings sometimes must, or indeed should, ‘die’ (Cairns and Jacobs, 
2014) via demolition and reconstruction, for example. What is notable about the super-
prime property market, however, in cities like London and New York, is that even new 
construction is, in many cases, itself a kind of socially dead space in which human 
habitation and social attachment are almost absent even after sale. This distinctive form 
of housing situation is described here as necrotecture.
One efect of the search for inward capital investment and the rich themselves 
has been the further stigmatization of urban poverty in the city, and the delegitimation 
of public services and institutions underwriting their daily existence. Popular, dense and 
well used spaces of public housing have been perversely designated as being underutilized 
compared with the ‘highest and best uses’ that might be derived were market logics to 
be applied (Raco and Kesten, 2018). Here decisions regarding the future and potential 
remaking of estates have been inluenced by the prospect of capital investment and 
inancialization of public housing models. These orientations stem in large part from 
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the expectations generated by a broader move towards super-prime investment as the 
rationality from which the future of the city should be judged and planned (Watt, 2016). 
In this context, a report regarding demolition, densiication and street building generated 
by a coalition of state planners and estate agencies appears as an important example of 
such imperatives (Savills, 2016) and drew signiicant criticism. Here the ‘best’ use of such 
space was interpreted in terms of the destruction and demolition of public housing in 
the name of producing more market-rate housing (Lees, 2014; Minton, 2017). More than 
50 London public housing estates have been ‘remodelled’ in this way with proposals 
continuing for the redevelopment of other public housing estates (Evans, 2016).
Processes of social and physical change operating under this urban regime of 
intensifying wealth accumulation and dispossession have fuelled debate about questions 
of security of tenure, housing quality and the right to remain in the city for those in 
more desperate circumstances. Despite this, continuing physical destruction of homes 
and social displacement have generated large numbers of private sector evictions 
and net losses of affordable homes. These processes can be read as new rounds of 
social banishment and expulsion (Sassen, 2014), often enacted by cash-strapped local 
governments attracted by the promise of private investment in a context in which the 
central state has increasingly absented itself. Austerity has left public planning agencies 
unable or unwilling to challenge the scale and intent of these changes (Webber and 
Burrows, 2016). In other cases such agencies have become tacitly co-opted in an agenda 
directed at achieving city success while paying scant attention to the place of the city’s 
politically weaker and materially poorer communities.
London’s position as a shining beacon for the globe’s super wealthy has not 
appeared to be good news for the wider population of the city. Even when the good 
times were rolling, the city was already being marked by an aggressive expansion of 
gentrification, tenant evictions, the demolition of dozens of public estates, welfare 
reforms and displacement. While some suggest that these forms of investment and 
destruction are related (Watt, 2016) the advent of Brexit deliberations and the potentially 
negative role of international investment has tended to be glossed over by the city’s elite 
in favour of continuing to seek international capital investment at a time of uncertainty. 
In this context, the rich and their signature buildings appear more as signs of the slow 
death of the city than of social vitality.
Necrotecture
The perceived threats and social concerns generated by relatively tall buildings 
are not new, inding echoes in the London of the early twentieth century (Dennis, 2008). 
Dennis’ work highlights that concerns about height, property values and who lives in 
such dwellings, even in the more aluent parts of the city, have been a recurring feature 
of the city’s life. It is therefore important to consider the kinds of space and occupancy 
of new rounds of high-rise and luxury construction in the city. Nevertheless, for some, 
the city’s new architecture indicates that the city is moving in the right direction. Here 
the notorious assessment of the director of Zaha Hadid architects, Patrick Schumacher, 
can be seen as a frank disclosure of the values circulating among some practices. 
Schumacher argued for the paving over of the city’s parks, the removal of public housing 
and the unleashing of markets more broadly as the means by which allocation of housing 
should operate in all cases. Surely, he suggested, everyone knows we beneit from dinner 
parties in the homes of the rich? Even while misjudging the views of the wider audience 
for these comments (the Mayor, Sadiq Khan, for one, slammed his ideas), such ideas 
nevertheless remain dominant among those who believe that the market should dictate 
what is built, where and with no concern for wider public value or contribution.
Much of the architecture springing from the ground in London, designed for 
investment, ofers broadly similar appeals to judgments in good taste, luxury and the 
savvy playing of housing markets to generate capital appreciation. Our understanding 
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of home as a place of use value is more or less upended by the dramatic expansion in 
the number of such residences and their rare occupation by their buyers. The hundreds 
of blocks under construction and those completed to date are predicated on massive 
surpluses in capital accumulation by wealthy individuals and by wealth funds looking 
for longer-term investment opportunities as well as, by no means insigniicant, criminal 
capital being laundered in the built environment itself. The towers themselves are often 
built to the greatest heights allowable under planning laws and have involved signiicant 
debate about the retention of the protected views of the city. The projections of the 
developments to come seem to signal the loss of the relatively low-rise European capital 
and the rise, in its place, of something altogether less recognizable.
As we see (Figure 1), the extent of emptiness in this new residential skyline is 
signiicant, highlighting the negligible contribution of such construction to the social 
needs of the city’s residents. The growing public recognition of these developments 
as homes for capital rather than people is now signiicant. How might we situate and 
understand the apparent waste and emptiness generated by investors and developers? 
One approach would be to utilize ideas developed by Fromm (1973) regarding the kinds 
of infatuation with death and destruction in the post-war, materialist cultures of the 
global West. Fromm became interested in the way that these cultures valued things and 
objects over people as one of the main methods by which feelings of satisfaction and 
social achievement were signalled. These ideas also relate to his work on the nature of 
the life course more broadly and what he identiied as orientations based on acquisition, 
rather than being and common humanity (Fromm, 1976). In The anatomy of human 
destructiveness (1973), Fromm identiied social forms of attraction to dead things and 
mechanical forms of interest that evaded notions of the social or human connection and 
reciprocity as a key feature of such societies. Obsessive materialism, Fromm reasoned, 
could be seen as a kind of rejection of the social in favour of material and lifeless goods. 
Possession and repeated rounds of endless consumption formed a wider process by 
which a denial of the limits of the human lifespan could be achieved. In societies that 
experienced not only rising living standards and disposable income but also increasing 
inequality and rising numbers of the very wealthy, the stage was set for new rounds of 
hyper consumption that have come about as wealth has been enlarged to historically 
unprecedented levels among a cohort of the super-rich at the global scale.
Fromm’s ideas appear useful in ofering some kind of general framing of the 
place of materialities and status trappings of society today, but are also particularly 
apposite in terms of helping us to consider forms of excess ownership. The empty, dead 
homes of the super-rich in cities like London and New York appear to remain lifeless 
even in terms of their role as home-like spaces. Such lifeless forms can be described then 
as a kind of necrotecture in which the architectural forms of the luxury housing market 
can be understood as dead residential space resulting from the conluence of circuits of 
international capital and desires for prestigious and showpiece homes that are more or 
less unused by the wealthy. The wider implication of necrotectural forms is signiicant 
since, given earlier discussion of the rounds of social and physical destruction taking 
place in the city, the production of these built environments is promoted by the city’s 
prevailing political regime. In addition, the place of the homes of the city’s poor have 
been declared themselves as a form of dead space––seen as underused by poorer groups. 
In this sense, the city’s residential landscape is being deined by competing power groups 
and interests with varying powers to designate or name what the problem is and how 
it should be resolved. For those with pure market orientations and the interests of the 
wealthy at heart, the problem is the unnecessary footprint of housing estates; for those 
afected by a lack of afordable housing, the empty shells of so many skyscrapers appear 
as illogical and aggravating. Meanwhile the rise of necrotectural forms associated with 
the wealthy and the relative absence of their owners may also be generating a threat to 
the social vitality of the wider city. This comes as a result of avoiding contributions to 
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afordable housing and its role in generating a physical symbolic sense of the city being 
of and for capital and the wealthy (Atkinson et al., 2017).
Marketing materials for many of the new developments ofer images of empty 
chrome interiors looking over the city into which prospective buyers are thereby able 
to project their presence as the city’s triumphant captains, without seeing signs of 
community life or troublesome social diference or poverty below. Property advertising 
for these spaces frequently depicts residential boundaries, such as panoramic glass 
windows and ininity pools as modern day dividing lines, between a risky city kept 
at bay and enclosed interiors which are often positioned high above street level. One 
developer extended these tropes further by adopting aesthetics derived from the ilm 
American Psycho, using a ‘winner-takes all’ overdub on advertising for one of its lagship 
developments, as its male igure stood looking over the city saying ‘I did this’. The use 
of these aesthetics feeds the sense that the outlook being targeted is one that relates to 
forms of social triumph and personal success that are divorced from, or potentially in 
opposition to, the social life of the wider city or to ideas of social reciprocity. Perhaps more 
importantly the place of a personal residence is read in such advertising as a space that is 
deined by its ability to insulate buyers from forms of social connection, while inhabiting 
myths of personal success driven by ambition, luck or hard work. As Tuan (1977: 38) 
once suggested, city building has long allowed the rich and powerful to command more 
visual space: ‘from their residences the rich are reassured of their position in life each 
time they look out the window and see the world at their feet’ (Figure 1).
In cities like London it appears that both developers and buyers have sought 
to demonstrate social standing and ambition via the opulence and architecture of 
many of the new developments. One way of reading these developments is to consider 
the way in which deeper psychosocial needs for approval, prestige and ambition are 
signiied in ediices which speak of the desires of their builders, designers and residents 
(Sudjic, 2005). Thus we can begin to think of how the construction of towers and luxury 
developments (see Figure 2) form models of the kind of ininity project mapped out by 
Becker (1973) in his analysis of how the human condition relates to its own existential 
terrors. For Becker, forms of consumption were to be interpreted as culturally embedded 
Figure 1 The Shard from the ’Walkie Talkie’ (photo by the author, January 2018)
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Figure 2 Luxury apartments on the Thames under construction (photo by the author, 
March 2017)
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methods through which the reality of death could be denied. The lifeless space found 
in many of the tower blocks and homes of the super-rich in London appear to ofer a 
glimpse into these anxieties, of death, status and acquisition, in an extreme form. Their 
presence displays a kind of material hyperconsumption that brings attention to a wider 
malaise within a culture and political economy devoted to apparently useless production.
The extent of dead residential space in London
In 1951 the population of Greater London was 8.1 million people. Like many other 
British cities, the mid-century census had recorded what was to be, for another 60 years, 
its peak. It now seems diicult to remember that London, and other British inner cities, 
were places of economic stagnation, social decline and persistent outmigration. The 
term ‘inner city’ was used to invoke a social imaginary marked by these features as 
much as any sense of real geographical place. By 1981, the nascent Thatcher government 
occupied a London the population of which had fallen to 6.6 million. The most recent 
survey of the city’s population in 2011 showed an all-time high of 8.2 million. Yet this 
apparent demographic health belies massive shifts in the structure of the city’s economy 
and new rounds of casualties in housing markets (Minton, 2017). Alongside changes 
in the city economy which saw it become a nodal point in the world inancial global 
economy, massive changes have reworked many neighbourhoods that would have been 
thought untouchable as potential sites of gentriication.
To understand the efect of capital of accumulation in creating a landscape of 
residential emptiness, one might choose to observe One Hyde Park, the many empty 
mansions lining The Bishops Avenue in North London, or along the river Thames at 
Nine Elms, part of the redevelopment of the major site of the decades-long empty shell 
of Battersea power station, where one can see numerous new towers lining the river’s 
corridor. At One Hyde Park the aesthetic is remarkably restrained, glass atria ofer subtle 
external divisions between the public space of the Knightsbridge streetscape and access 
to the lifts to the residences inside. It has become almost banal for journalists to observe 
the lack of lights being on in the evening, alongside exposés of the ofshore purchasing 
of many of its residences (Shaxson, 2013). In many ways this residence, like many others, 
ofers only a partial foothold in the city for its part-time occupants. Access by car is to an 
underground car park that allows seamless access to the interior. Residents can easily 
move between multiple residences using combinations of private jets or irst-class travel, 
private cars or taxis and the safety of these bunker-like spaces (Atkinson, 2016).
Despite the obvious obstacles in the way of gaining information posed by 
developers and owners, it is possible to estimate the scale of absence associated with 
these necrotectural forms and to ofer some enumeration of the city’s dead residential 
space. One way of approaching the issue is to look at proxy measures of underuse, such 
as that uncovered by examining utility records to locate homes with abnormally low 
electricity use. Analysis of these data has revealed that there are around 21,000 homes 
in the city that are long-term empty (Transparency International, 2017). In fact, around 
5% of homes in Central and Western London lie empty according to the government’s 
statistics agency using similar data sources (Gask and Williams, 2015). Perhaps some 
of the best estimates of the scale of necrotecture can be gleaned from combining an 
analysis of recently commissioned reports on the scale of under occupancy in the 
new-build market in the city, most of which is centrally located and takes the form of 
apartments.
Nearly all new builds in London are apartments (89%) (Wallace et al., 2017) and 
between 2014 and 2016 around one in six (13%) of these was sold to overseas buyers. 
This igure rises to more than a third of buyers (36%) if we look at the ‘prime’ market 
areas of central London. Most overseas sales are to buyer investors, often looking to rent, 
sometimes to simply hold the asset for capital growth (see, for example, Ho and Atkinson, 
2017). In this important study vacancy was measured using transactional data, which 
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highlight residences for which there is little or no inancial, retail or administrative 
paper trail. Using this measure, empty dwellings comprise half (49.5%) of all prime 
residences in new builds and 19.4% of dwellings in the inner London boroughs more 
generally. Notably these igures rise alongside the value of homes––39% of homes worth 
£1–5 million are underused and 64% of homes worth over £5 million. The igure for 
homes owned by those overseas was 42.3%. Work by another team of researchers has 
showed that half of all sales in central London between 2014 and 2016 were to overseas 
buyers (Scanlon et al., 2017) and that Londoners were efectively excluded as tenants or 
buyers from 6% of sales.
In 2011, the most recent census period which captures all residents and homes, 
vacant housing comprised around 3.5% for London as a whole (homes where it was 
recorded that no one was usually resident). For the City of London the igure was a 
quarter, in Westminster 19% and Kensington and Chelsea 14%. Despite much anxiety 
from property professionals, the sale of high-value homes persists, even after concerns 
over Brexit and both the national and city economy’s futures, as shown in Table 1. Sales 
of prime and super-prime homes remain buoyant according to these data. London 
planning authorities have also permitted the construction of a further 26,000 prime 
market apartments, roughly the equivalent of one year’s gross housing supply in the 
city. The general picture generated by these indings is of a market very much alive in 
its own terms, yet productive of a landscape of dwellings remarkably uninhabited by its 
apparent owners.
Other troublesome questions attach themselves to the city’s market in dead 
residential space. Non-partisan groups (Transparency International, 2017) have 
highlighted significant flows of criminal capital and the anonymous purchase of 
thousands of homes. The head of the National Crime Agency has also suggested that 
criminal money in this property market has driven up property prices and that hundreds 
of millions of pounds worth of property is the subject of criminal investigation as 
suspected proceeds of corruption. Yet these igures may only represent a fraction of the 
total amount. In 2015, Transparency International had already revealed that around 10% 
of properties in Kensington and Chelsea were owned through a ‘secrecy jurisdiction’ 
and tied to around £122 billion of ofshore money.
One of the reasons for the rise of necrotecture is the use of the built environment 
as a store for laundered monies with no need for human residence as such; these 
dwellings are often sold at a later stage or provide a potential retreat if needed. In 2016 
the National Crime Agency (NCA) estimated that around £170 billion of UK real estate is 
held by more than 30,000 tax haven companies. Key developments stick out. For example, 
The Tower at St George Wharf in Vauxhall has a quarter of its lats held through ofshore 
companies and a greater number at One Hyde Park (Shaxson, 2013). The point here of 
course is that not all of this money is criminal, but such vehicles are strongly associated 
with eforts at tax avoidance and laundering. Despite growing public anger at these 
problems, only 1 in 300 property purchases by overseas cash buyers triggers ‘red lags’, 
which raise suspicions with the NCA about the sources of such money (National Crime 
Agency, 2017). There is frequent talk about tackling corruption and illicit lows of capital 
Table 1 Total numbers of sales of prime and super-prime dwellings
£1 m - £4.99 m £5 m - £9.99 m (prime) £10 m + (super-prime) Total
2015 10,989 569 397 11,955
2016 10,272 543 401 11,216
2017 10,587 569 435 11,591
SOURCE: Land Registry
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but action remains undelivered. This market is also moving into new waters, with 
some premium developments being advertised for sale in Bitcoins with the risk that 
untraceable movements of criminal capital may low more easily as a result.
One of the most glaring injustices is that while essential workers and even 
those on higher incomes struggle to access decent housing, the city is producing tens of 
thousands of apartments annually for people who either never use them or signiicantly 
underuse them. The question often raised is who beneits from homes left unused by 
its buyers? The image generated is of a planning system that is generally inefective and 
often leaves unchallenged the construction of blocks of apartments in which the idea of 
a handful of afordable homes is seen as a threat to market viability (Crosby and Wyatt, 
2016). Mounting evidence shows that developers and planning consultants work hard 
to circumvent their duty to ofer either afordable housing or cash contributions to the 
local authority (Atkinson and Tait, 2017). Criticism of this system has been growing for 
some years now, but the rising intensity of anger is palpable.
At the same time as many of these blocks are rarely or almost never occupied, 
around a third of those deemed to be homeless are exported outside their boroughs or 
to other cities and regions, and a quarter of a million households languish on waiting 
lists for public housing in the city (DCLG, 2016). Alongside the erosion of support 
for those working and on low or no incomes has also come a massive expansion of 
residential space via extensions downwards to create even more space. While existing 
space standards for new-build homes have contracted in the general market, homes for 
the most aluent have been expanded through basement construction. A recent report 
using planning applications data has shown that 4,650 mega basements with facilities 
for private cinemas (456), staf quarters, swimming pools (376) and gyms (996), among 
other facilities that even include private nightclub spaces, cigar rooms and a private 
beach, have been constructed or are being built in seven of London’s central boroughs 
(Baldwin et al., 2018). The contrast between this intense luxury and the social conditions 
of the wider city could hardly be starker.
Conclusion
Deyan Sudjic’s (2005) idea of an ediice complex referred to the ways in which 
building projects have often been used to validate the egos of the rich and powerful. But 
today perhaps instead of looking to the projects of Hitler, Hussein or Ceaucescu, we 
might turn to the cold steel and glass of the Shard, the Candy Brother’s grand absentia 
of One Hyde Park or the rarely occupied tower at St George’s Wharf, among many others. 
London’s necrotecture coexists alongside a pronounced need for human shelter by 
many of the capital’s other residents. The city’s empty lats raise diicult and important 
political questions within a city in which residents of some London boroughs face a 
50-year wait for public housing. The imprint of wealth and the impact of money run 
deeply in the daily rhythms of the city as a political and economic machine, much to the 
detriment of its role as a social space (Atkinson et al., 2017).
Empty homes owned by the city’s wealthiest, left unoccupied for investment 
purposes or as the mere trappings of status, speak of an apparent love of dead objects. 
This dead residential space, or necrotecture, brings attention to the level of waste and 
overconsumption by the rich in increasing contrast to the divided city below. The ideas 
of ‘ghost neighbourhoods’ and ‘lights-out London’ similarly resonate with notions of 
death and the deadening efect of necrotecture on the social vitality of the wider city. 
These residential spaces are ‘dead’ at a number of levels. First, they are more or less 
dead spaces in their own right, either unused or barely used for large periods of time. 
As shown here, this absence is increasingly well documented. Second, necrotecture 
appears to threaten the public life of the city and the livelihood of its working citizens. 
This efect operates particularly as capital helps to divert productive capacity towards 
redundant usage in the form of building apartment blocks for the wealthy, second homes 
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and the ‘buy to leave’ market more broadly. Third, in the architecture of the rich we 
see an attempt at defying mortality through projects that represent diverting forms of 
hyperconsumption and monolithic ediices intended to last beyond human lifespans. 
Finally, in the taint of corruption, money laundering and organized criminal investment 
in real estate, we see associations with death and violence as the city and property 
markets are enrolled in the needs of criminal investment activity (Platt, 2015).
The lifeless interiors of the architecture that has emerged from a conluence of 
capital investment and status seeking speaks of a kind of endpoint of urbanism that inds 
echoes in the analysis of Davis (2002). At a more prosaic level, the rise of necrotecture 
signiies the inability of the city and its political leadership to corral investment and 
economic activity in such a way that citizens are ofered stronger assurances––of livelihood 
and home (Engelen et al., 2017). The housing crisis itself is produced by a system in 
which money rather than people is the primary index of success (Jacobs and Manzi, 
forthcoming). Political and economic forces have been cemented in places in ways that 
have facilitated the production of lifeless spaces that are dynamically linked to increasing 
social inequality, global chaos and low-intensity warfare, as well as globalized criminality 
elsewhere. Upon these unstable factors it seems that London’s economy now depends.
The literal meaning of a plutocracy is the idea of a political system controlled or 
shaped by the rich. But such power is more extensive and perhaps more worrisome than 
the idea of simply a rigged political system. London is a plutocratic city (Atkinson et al., 
2017); it is ‘bought’ by and for the rich, by, with and for their capital. Money inluences 
planning decisions as surveyors argue that non-market housing may taint the market 
prospects of internationally marketed apartment blocks. Big money is involved in, and 
accepted by, corrupt or negligent real-estate agents and solicitors who do not alert 
the regulators as part of their due diligence. Of course the money of the monied also 
inluences the politics of the city and the acceptable range of decisions that can be made 
about who the city is for and how its economy is run. Mayors in New York and London 
have told the world that they are open for business or that they wish for as many rich 
people to move there as possible. The result of this political economic context is that 
a new residential skyline has emerged with few, if any, people inhabiting it at a time of 
pronounced social need generated by austerity policies and an economic reverse that 
has touched the lives of many others in the city.
The wider impact of flows of global capital is evidenced in the hundreds of 
residences under construction and which are targeted at the ranks of the wealthy. The 
cultural, political and economic context driving these built forms is notable and appears 
as a mark of a late capitalist urbanism and its assumptions that social need, ecological 
limits and political resistance can be denied with impunity and in seeming perpetuity. 
Yet the impact of these choices and the lack of social investment seem likely to haunt the 
city for many years to come. While many see towers and luxury residences as a mark of 
economic vitality, this apparent energy belies the social absences of these spaces and it 
is this feature that is generative of an intensifying and increasingly political anger in the 
city. The sense of these spaces and developments as dead further emphasizes their role, 
not as homes, but as tradeable assets and as signiiers of the kind of urban and housing 
alienation that now pervades the capital.
Rowland Atkinson, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, University of Shefield, 
Western Bank, Shefield S10 2TN, UK, rowland.atkinson@shefield.ac.uk
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